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From Theory to Practice I: Passing 








In an earlier work, we offered a view on how trade should be treated
within a theory of global justice.1  We proposed an account of exploitation 
to spell out the nature of the obligations that arise from trading.  That account 
greatly benefits from a detailed development for concrete cases.  The goal 
of this study and its close companion2 is to explore how our philosophical 
views help formulate judgments on a range of moral problems that arise 
from trading and to identify responsibilities of various actors and inform
policy responses to instances of exploitation in trade. 
* © 2015 Mathias Risse.  Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Harvard 
University. 
** © 2015 Gabriel Wollner.  Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Humboldt
University. 
1. Mathias Risse & Gabriel Wollner, Three Images of Trade: On the Place of
Trade in a Theory of Global Justice, 1 MORAL PHIL. & POL. 201 (2014) [hereinafter Risse 
& Wollner, Three Images of Trade].  We also offer a critical assessment of AARON JAMES, 
FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012), and the 
approach explored therein, which conceives of fairness in trade in terms of distributive 
principles that apply to the overall gains from trade.  Mathias Risse & Gabriel Wollner, 
Critical Notice of Aaron James, Fairness in Practice, A Social Contract for a Global 
Economy, 43 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 382 (2013) (book review).  Unless otherwise stated, trade 
always means international trade. We are grateful for comments to and discussion with 
participants of the conference on Global Justice and Fair Trade at the University of San 
Diego Law School, held in April 2015. 
2. Mathias Risse & Gabriel Wollner, From Theory to Practice II: Passing Judgments 
of Exploitation (forthcoming). 
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To that end we use a well-known episode in the recent history of 
activism against a multinational corporation—the protests against Nike.
We use Harvard Business School Case No. 9-700-047 (the Case), written
up by Debora Spar.3  The title is Hitting the Wall: Nike and International
Labor Practices. This is a thirteen-page discussion (plus several pages of
exhibits) describing Nike’s success story and subsequent plights with 
labor activists through the ‘90s.  Even though the Case has been used for 
teaching purposes since 2002, it has lost none of its systematic interest.  It 
draws on a range of contexts where judgments of exploitation continue to 
be made and refers to ongoing businesses practices.  The case has the 
additional advantage that it tells the story of one company (a well-known 
one, making it likely many of our readers own its products), which allows
us to assess a number of judgments as part of an interconnected story, 
rather than deal with a laundry list of scenarios.  In some instances, the 
Case itself uses the terminology of exploitation, but in others, it does not.4 
Our aim in discussing this Case is twofold.  On the one hand, we show 
that the notion of exploitation can fruitfully be applied to thinking about 
justice in trade. On the other hand, we cast judgment on central aspects 
of Nike’s activity in Southeast Asia.5 
One downside of our strategy of expounding judgments of exploitation 
in terms of this Case is that there are too many questions that need careful 
treatment.  We have therefore broken this discussion into two pieces,
narrating the Case in both.  Section 2 summarizes our account of exploitation 
and elaborates on the distinction between moral problems that arise in the
context of trade and those that arise from trading. Section 3 presents the 
Case and develops six questions for discussion in this piece and its 
companion.  The first of three addressed in this study is the following:
What moral questions arise in the context of relocating or outsourcing a 
3. Debora L. Spar, Hitting the Wall: Nike and International Labor Practices, 
Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-700-047 (Rev. Sept. 6, 2002), https://
hbr.org/product/hitting-the-wall-nike-and-international-labor-practices/700047-PDF-ENG 
[https://perma.cc/WY2R-2JHT]. 
4. See, e.g., id. at 2–3 (“[W]ithin this success story lay a central irony . . . the 
manufacture [of this high profile fashion item] was based on . . . low-paid, non-American
workers. For according to [the] original plan, not only would Nike outsource, but it would 
outsource specifically to low cost parts of the world.”). 
5. One might wonder about our use of the Case in the following way: trade, one 
might think, essentially concerns an exchange of goods between two parties in pursuit of 
their respective advantage, whereas the Case is much more complex.  But in our world, 
there is much more to trade than an exchange of goods between two parties.  Goods are 
produced by people who stand in employment relations, and within companies that are 
part of complex political settings.  A multitude of potentially exploitative situations is 
forthcoming in this way. 
1036 























[VOL. 52: 1035, 2015] Passing Judgments of Exploitation 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
business?6  In response we formulate conditions under which relocation is
or is not morally problematic.  One important result is that moral and 
political outrage at relocating companies to wealthier countries should 
often be redirected at the political community for not doing enough to
soften the blow that some people suffer from such a move.  The second
question is the following: How should a company deal with an authoritarian 
regime in a country where it does business?7  In response we offer some 
thoughts on the circumstances under which states of exploitation could be 
justified as stepping stones towards a just world.  The third question is the 
following: Under what conditions is compliance with existing regulation— 
such as labor protection legislation—required, and under what conditions 
are violations acceptable?8  We argue that absent special circumstances, a 
company ought to comply even if its competitors do not. 
The remaining three questions, addressed in the companion piece, are 
these: How should one think about a just wage: is it a matter of productivity, 
should it reflect needs, or does it amount to an appropriate share in 
profits?; Is Nike responsible for actions of its subcontractors and thus 
perhaps guilty of indirect exploitation if, for instance, those subcontractors 
pay unjust wages?; Finally, do safety and health standards generate 
particular problems from the standpoint of exploitation? 
Our focus on a company in this study and its companion should not
deflect from the fact that our approach can account for exploitation among
a range of actors—individuals, states, companies, international organizations. 
Nor should this focus be taken as an indication that efforts at ending 
exploitation should target companies rather than governments.9  Our  
project here is to think through a number of normative judgments, and we 
use Nike as a case study for that purpose. 
SECTION 2 
Before proceeding to the Case, let us summarize our account of
exploitation. To exploit somebody is to take unfair advantage of her. This 
6. See infra Sections 4–5. 
7. See infra Sections 6–8. 
8. See infra Section 9. 
9. See RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: 
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 17 (2013), for the argument that 
private initiatives to improve labor standards in global supply chains have the best chance 
of succeeding when interacting with state regulation. 
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colloquial account generally implies a claim about an act or interaction as 
well as a claim about an outcome, distribution, or transfer that arises in 
virtue of the interaction.10 Exploitation is a complex notion with descriptive 
and normative components.  The descriptive component delineates the 
concept and determines when acts are exploitative. The normative component
captures its wrongness.11  Exploitation is a moral defect of a distribution 
and its history that cannot be reduced to a defect of either the distribution 
or its history.  The defect of a history or interaction that would count as 
coercive or oppressive becomes exploitative if it generates a particular 
outcome and brings about a certain distribution or transfer of benefits. The 
defect of a distribution that would count as unfair becomes exploitative if 
it arises from a certain sort of interaction.12  Different conceptions of 
exploitation identify different acts or relationships as exploitative and 
offer competing accounts of the wrongness involved. We provide a unified 
approach to these conceptions.13 
So we define exploitation as a transfer T or a distribution D between 
parties A and B, which arises as a consequence of interaction I, enabled 
by some ex ante features F, violating some moral principle P such that the 
moral defect cannot be readily reduced to a defect of either T, D, I, or F. 
Different conceptions argue about what I must involve for exploitation to 
occur, for instance, whether the victim is forced to interact.  They also 
disagree about what type of outcome, distribution D or transfer T, 
characterizes exploitation that is, about whether there must be a net transfer 
or whether the distribution must be such that the exploiter’s relative 
position improves through the transaction.  Similarly, different conceptions 
disagree about what ex ante features F could give rise to exploitation, for 
instance, whether a feature for which the would-be victim is herself
responsible may do so.  Finally they argue about the source of the wrongness, 
the principle P violated by exploitation.14 
Our earlier article, Three Images of Trade, works with three conceptions
that this framework can accommodate.15  To begin with, Hillel Steiner
10. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 215. 
11. Id. at 214. 
12. For the related idea that domination, of which exploitation might be seen as an 
instance, occupies the “conceptual realm between coercion and unfairness,” see Nicholas 
Vrousalis, Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination, 41 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 131, 
151 (2013). 
13. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 215. 
14. Id.
 15. See id. at 217–20. 
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offers a conception based on a left libertarian theory of property rights.16 
A voluntary transaction or exchange is exploitative if it involves a 
property rights violation before or during the exchange and an unequal 
exchange between parties in the sense that one party receives less than
what she would receive had the violation not occurred.  The victim of 
exploitation may differ from the victim of the original violation, and the 
exploiter may not be the original violator.  The wrong in exploitation is to 
benefit from an unrectified wrong, combining the wrongness of the 
violation with a subsequent transfer or distribution.17 
For Robert Goodin, an exploitative exchange or transaction is one
where one party uses its superior position to press for an advantage against
the vulnerable.18  Protecting the vulnerable requires that we suspend 
behaviour that is ordinarily appropriate and refrain from pressing our 
advantage. It is inappropriate to play for advantage when others do not, 
are no match for us, or are suffering a misfortune.  To exploit a person
here is to play for advantage where it is inappropriate.19 
Nicholas Vrousalis proposes an account of exploitation as domination 
for self-enrichment.20  The exploiter instrumentalizes economic vulnerability
to trigger an unreciprocated transfer of goods in a way that is disrespectful
of or offensive to the equal status of the exploited.  The victim lacks an 
important good she can obtain only from the exploiter. The exploiter has 
power because he can get the victim to perform acts she otherwise would 
not do.21  Exploitation occurs if exploiters instrumentalize vulnerability to
appropriate benefits.  Here Vrousalis’s account resembles Goodin’s. 
Exploitation is wrong because it is offensive to the equality of status of
those in the exploitation relationship, and thus because it is disrespectful
 16. See Hillel Steiner, Exploitation: A Liberal Theory Amended, Defended and
Extended, in MODERN THEORIES OF EXPLOITATION 132 (Andrew Reeve ed., 1987); Hillel 
Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94  ETHICS 225 (1984). 
17. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 217 (citing Steiner, 
Exploitation: A Liberal Theory Amended, Defended, and Extended, supra note 16, at 133). 
18. Id. at 218 (citing Robert E. Goodin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a
Person, in MODERN THEORIES OF EXPLOITATION, supra note 16, at 166, 184). 
19. Id.
 20. See Vrousalis, supra note 12, at 131. 
21. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 219 (citing Vrousalis, 
supra note 12, at 136). 
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of the victim.22 For instance, Marxist complaints about capitalist exploitation
register as complaints about relations of production that dominate workers.23 
This is a generic account of exploitation that applies to many domains 
of life, paradigmatically also—but not exclusively—to trade.  Unfair
advantage-taking is pervasive and affects our lives in smaller and bigger 
ways.  Not in all cases is exploitation a matter of justice. To connect 
exploitation to justice, our earlier work enlisted the grounds-of-justice 
approach in Mathias Risse, On Global Justice, and argued that the nature
of injustice in trade consists of exploitation—rather than, as for instance,
Aaron James has it, in the violation of distributive principles for the 
overall amount of gains from trade.24  Justice captures the most stringent 
moral demands.  Grounds are those properties of individuals that make it 
the case that certain demands of justice apply among a group of people.
The grounds Risse distinguishes are shared membership in states, common
humanity, shared subjection to the trading system, membership in the 
global order, and humanity’s collective ownership of the earth.  Each ground 
is associated with different principles of justice.  What makes something 
a ground of justice is the significance for human life of the features 
captured by that ground.25 
What we mean by trade as a ground of justice is the system of
international agreements that legally structure trade, create incentives, and 
render economic interaction predictable and enforceable.  As Paul Seabright 
explains, trade is one of the most significant ways of taking advantage of 
the human ability to allow individuals who are not closely genetically
related to engage in intentionally coordinated activities.26  That is,  by  
allowing human beings to build a web of interactions that spans the globe, 
trade is one of the most significant ways of obtaining one’s share of the 
overall betterment that springs from our capacity to stage deliberately
collaborative efforts. Much trade occurs domestically, and there too 
exploitation might occur. But from the standpoint of justice, trade within 
one country is covered by domestic principles that are sufficiently broad 
to cover economic activities among citizens.  To the extent that trade 
22. Id. (quoting Vrousalis, supra note 12, at 139). 
23. Id.; see also Vrousalis, supra note 12, at 137 (“[A]ssuming an equal distribution
of internal resources, the wealth owned by capitalists systematically gives then a decisive 
bargaining advantage over workers, which means capitalists always have and can take
advantage of economic power over workers (and never vice versa).”). 
24. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 223–24, 223 n.27 
(citing MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 2, 26 n.6 (2012)); AARON JAMES, FAIRNESS IN 
PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY 14–21 (2012). 
25. RISSE, supra note 24, at 11. 
26. PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 4 (rev. ed. 2010). 
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occurs beyond borders, it is governed by what James calls market-reliance
mechanisms largely maintained by states and international organizations, 
especially the WTO that capture the rules according to which trade unfolds.27 
It is in virtue of the fact that trade is governed by such mechanisms, as 
well as in light of its relevance for human life, that trade is a ground of
justice. 
To see how the grounds-of-justice framework applies to trade and how
judgments of exploitation relate to other moral claims, note that not all 
moral problems that arise in the context of trade arise from trading.28 
Sometimes trade is only the setting within which we become aware of,
say, human rights issues.  The relevant ground of justice might well be 
common humanity, which gives rise to human rights obligations that apply
at the level of humanity as such and should be divided up appropriately
among different actors in the global order.29  Trade might then not generate 
obligations of its own but merely select individuals or entities that should 
do certain things, although this obligation applies to humanity as a whole. 
But in addition, trade also generates obligations of its own, and those, as 
our earlier work argues, arise specifically in the presence of exploitation.30 
Consider the following scenario from an article by Matt Zwolinski.31 
Suppose company A exploits its workers abroad but improves their
situation vis-à-vis their status quo ante.  Many people would disapprove. 
But people do not generally disapprove of company B for not outsourcing
labor and for thereby not improving anybody’s situation abroad, nor 
would they disapprove of A for not improving the situation of people who 
are indirectly connected to its commercial operations, as bus drivers or 
bakers might be connected to a factory.32  Could such judgments be
warranted? As Zwolinski puts it: “How, then, can it be permissible to
neglect workers in the developing world, but impermissible to exploit 
them, when exploitation is better for both parties (including workers who 
are in desperate need of betterment)?”33 
To begin with, let us assume that, to the extent that any of these people 
have claims on us regarding an improvement of their situation, this is 
27. See JAMES, supra note 24, at 90. 
28. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 212. 
29. See RISSE, supra note 24, at 63–88, 209–31. 
30. Risse & Wollner, Three Images of Trade, supra note 1, at 212. 
31. Matt Zwolinski, Structural Exploitation, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2012, at 154. 
32. See id. at 167–68. 
33. Id. (citing ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 289–93 (1996)). 
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because their human rights are violated, possibly their right to subsistence 
living.  The duty-bearer is the global order as such, with a suitable distribution 
of specific obligations among various actors in that order.  If certain human 
rights are unmet, one must assess in what ways different actors have failed.
The state where they live presumably has to shoulder a fair amount of 
responsibility, but as do international organizations, other states, and possibly
businesses.  Conceivably  B might be blamed for not getting involved
internationally, or the government of the country where B is located might
have to shoulder some of the responsibility for taking appropriate measures
to help people rise above a certain level, which in turn might involve B. 
A might be blamed for not doing enough to support people whose lives it 
could readily effect, such as bus drivers and bakers. But in this case too, 
the responsibility lies with the global order as such.  A is singled out only
because it could readily do something for which there is a collective 
responsibility.34 
If A improves the lives of its workers, it would thereby take up some of 
the collectively shared responsibility.35  To the extent that their standard 
of living falls below subsistence, A could be selected to improve their 
situation—not because as an employer it must make sure its workers can
live above a threshold, but because it might well be the most suitable agent 
to take up a particular collective obligation. So this obligation arises for 
A in the context of trade, but not from trading.  But in addition, in virtue 
of standing in a commercial relationship with its workers, A also assumes 
a special responsibility with regard to them, similar to how a state has 
special responsibilities to its citizens.  The question then arises whether 
the company is also guilty of exploitation.  It is possible that we find the 
company guilty of exploitation while also acknowledging that it is living 
up to its human rights obligations as an entity in the global order. 
So we should modify our original judgments about A and B. B bears a 
reasonable share of blame for the inactivity or indifference with which the 
global order as such approaches human rights deficiencies.  To the extent 
that B does nothing to help, we disapprove of its performance, but this 
judgment will be harsher the more plausible it would be that specifically
B should assume responsibility for rectifying certain failures (because, for 
34.  More would need to be said about how, and based on what criteria, obligations 
for which, strictly speaking, the global order as such is the duty-bearer can be broken down 
into particular obligations of entities within the global order.  We take it for granted here 
that, once the plausibility of the overall view is granted (global order as duty-bearer, where 
then specific entities within that order must shoulder responsibilities to make good on the 
duties), actual ability to shoulder a particular obligation is a sensible criterion. 
35. It is a different question whether a company deserves praise for taking up a 
share of global responsibilities if it does so only in pursuit of profit.  Presumably it does 
not. 
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instance, it is the kind of business that could readily make a difference).
Of A’s activities we would approve to the extent that A assumes commonly 
shared responsibilities, and disapprove to the extent that, in the process, it
violates its obligation not to exploit its workers. 
The exploitation A inflicts would be an injustice.  It might be discretionary, 
the sort of behavior the company could stop or whose discontinuation it 
could bring about without substantially effecting its operations.  Such
exploitation ought to cease immediately.  But the exploitation might also 
be structural. That is, were A to cease its exploitative treatment, doing so 
would undermine its operations due to the conditions under which it runs 
its business, for instance tough competition generating only small profit 
margins, without improving the workers’ situation.36 Possibly the injustice
of exploitation could be seen as a stepping stone towards a just world and 
as transitory, in the sense that what would follow would be a state of 
affairs closer to a just world.  Such an argument would have to be made,
and economic incentives might make it too tempting for some to accept
such a claim.  But in principle, something like this could be true. The path 
to a just world may lead through many layers of injustice.  This is a topic 
to which we return below as we assess judgments of exploitation. After 
all, as we have seen, judgments of exploitation might be appropriate and
identify an injustice, but nonetheless, under certain conditions this
exploitation is acceptable for the time being.
SECTION 3 
Let us summarize the Case by way of highlighting the judgments we 
discuss subsequently.37  Based in Oregon, Nike had been a corporate 
36. For the discretionary/structural distinction, see Robert Mayer, Sweatshops, 
Exploitation, and Moral Responsibility, 38 J. SOC. PHIL. 605, 610 (2007) [hereinafter
Mayer, Sweatshops, Exploitation, and Moral Responsibility]; Robert Mayer, What’s
Wrong with Exploitation?, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 137, 143, 148 (2007). 
37. Nike’s corporate strategy and relationship with its labor pool have garnered a 
fair amount of discussion over the years.  See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2000) (the 
classic); LOCKE, supra note 9 (a more recent investigation, with particular emphasis on 
Nike in chapters 3 and 5); see also Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Perils of 
Globalization: The Case of Nike, in MANAGEMENT: INVENTING AND DELIVERING ITS 
FUTURE 39 (Thomas A. Kochan & Richard L. Schmalensee eds., 50th anniversary ed. 
2003) (analyzing Nike as a case study of the benefits and risks of globalization for 
company performance and corporate citizenship).  For the history of Nike until the early 
‘90s, see J.B. STRASSER & LAURIE BECKLUND, SWOOSH: THE UNAUTHORIZED STORY OF
NIKE AND THE MEN WHO PLAYED THERE (HarperCollins Publishers paperback ed., 1993)
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success story for several decades before it became subject to sustained
boycotts and negative commentary for labor offenses such as underage 
workers in Indonesia, forced overtime in China, and dangerous working 
conditions in Vietnam.38  What differentiated Nike, and had won it a 40% 
share of the $14.7 billion athletic footwear market as of 1997, was its 
corporate strategy.39  Devised by legendary CEO Phil Knight while he was 
still in business school in the early ‘60s, the core idea was that Nike would 
outsource all production and invest funds thereby saved into advertising, 
especially high-profile endorsements by celebrity athletes such as, in due 
course, Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods. A virtual company, with no 
production facilities, Nike became one of the world’s most recognized
brands by the early 1990s, using the “swoosh” as its logo.40  Nike insisted 
that it neither produced nor sold shoes.  It sold an image of athleticism and
urban cool.41  Customers should, and would, buy its products for much 
more than their usefulness as footwear warranted.
But the shoes themselves had to come from somewhere. The 
manufacturing process behind Nike’s operations rested on a frequently 
uneasy relationship with a far-flung empire of workers in low-cost countries.42 
This is where our questions begin.  Nike’s road to success started with 
outsourcing.43  The company “signed its first contracts with Japanese 
manufacturers,” but later “shifted its supply base to . . . South Korea and
Taiwan.”44  By 1990, those countries having grown richer, costs rose, and 
(1991).  For a discussion of corporate competitor Reebok, specifically in China, see 
Xiaomin Yu, Impacts of Corporate Code of Conduct on Labor Standards: A Case Study 
of Reebok’s Athletic Footwear Supplier Factory in China, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 513 (2008). 
For a well-known, vivid account of the contrast between a corporate strategy focused on 
marketing and the reality of shoe production, see JOHN C. RYAN & ALAN THEIN DURNING, 
STUFF: THE SECRET LIVES OF EVERYDAY THINGS 26–33 (1997). For a reflection on the role
of corporations in a globalizing economy where national regulatory instruments are often 
insufficient, see John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The
Corporate Connection, in  TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 93
(David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003).  For the challenges arising for 
companies in a globalizing economy, see SUZANNE BERGER, MIT  INDUS. PERFORMANCE 
CTR., HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT COMPANIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE DOING TO MAKE 
IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005).
 38. Spar, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
39. Id. at 2. 
40. Id.
 41. Id.
 42. See id. at 1.
 43. See id. at 2.
 44. Id. at 3.  Nike’s corporate activities have not been limited to East and Southeast 
Asia; see César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, Nike’s Law: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 
Transnational Corporations, and the Struggle over International Labor Rights in the 
Americas, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 64 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & 
1044 
RISSE-WOLLNER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2016 3:33 PM  
 
 

















[VOL. 52: 1035, 2015] Passing Judgments of Exploitation 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Nike urged its suppliers to move to China and Indonesia.45  QUESTION 1 
is under what conditions, if any, would the original decision to outsource
production to facilities abroad be morally problematic?  A related issue is 
under what conditions, if any, is a subsequent shift of facilities from one 
foreign country to another morally problematic?  As in all normative 
questions that arise from the Case, our concern is with both judgments of 
exploitation and how they figure in all-things-considered verdicts. 
Indonesia initially seemed an ideal location for Nike’s subcontractors. 
To attract investments, the Suharto government facilitated a climate where 
wages were low, the workforce docile, and unions oppressed.46  Due to
the resulting wage differential, in the early ‘90s shoes from China and
Indonesia cost 50% less than shoes from Taiwan and South Korea.47  Our 
QUESTION 2 is how should one think about Nike’s and its subcontractors’
dealings with an authoritarian regime and the resulting repressed labor 
pool?  Are the company’s actions exploitative?  Are they acceptable, all
things considered? 
In spite of the initial advantages in relocating to Indonesia, a “wave of 
labor unrest” soon swept through the country.48  Foreign companies came 
up for increasingly critical scrutiny and workers made unprecedented 
demands.49  Before long, Nike had emerged as a key target.  The company 
was accused of “encourag[ing] contractors to mistreat their workers in
pursuit of unrealistic production quotas.”50  Widespread corruption made 
worker-protection legislation unenforceable.51  While this situation was 
not of Nike’s making, observers surmised that it took advantage of this 
climate of impunity.  Like other firms, Nike regarded this climate as part 
of the background conditions of its operations and worried its business 
would suffer relative to others if Nike acted against prevailing conditions. 
This leads to QUESTION 3: under what conditions is compliance with
existing regulation, such as labor-protection legislation, required, and 
under what conditions are violations acceptable?  Can we throw light on 
these issues from the standpoint of exploitation? 
César A. Rodríguez-Gravtio eds., 2005), for a discussion of labor issues involving Nike 
and other companies in Mexico and Guatemala. 
45. Spar, supra note 3, at 3.
 46. Id.
 47. Id. (citing Mark Clifford, Pain in Pusan, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 5, 1992, at 59). 
48. Id.
 49. Id. at 3–5. 
50. Id. at 4. 
51. Id. 
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Many workers were unable to meet daily requirements for food and 
other necessities.52  These conditions increasingly attracted attention by 
labor activists and journalists from inside and outside of Indonesia. 
Before long, neither the Indonesian government nor Nike could ignore the 
increasingly vocal critics.53 In 1992, the government raised the minimum 
wage, but even that new wage seemed insufficient to cover basic needs 
and was frequently diluted in various ways.  Without manufacturing facilities 
of its own, Nike insisted it could not be accountable for failures of its 
contractors.54 
The company continued its strategy of investing heavily into advertising. 
According to one soon-to-be-famous comparison, it would take Indonesian 
workers 44,492 years to earn as much as Michael Jordan pocketed for
endorsements.55  Many observers thought this imbalance indicated the
workers failed to receive a just wage. This leads to QUESTION 4: is a 
just wage a matter of productivity, or should it reflect needs, or does it 
amount to an appropriate share in profits?  Again we must explore whether 
it is a matter of exploitation if things are not as they should be in this 
domain.  After all, many of the concerns in the labor dispute were about 
wages, whether those were enough to compensate workers, too little
compared to the price of the product or compared to what others made 
who contributed to the sales, or too little to live on.  We now also reach
QUESTION 5, namely, whether Nike is responsible for the actions of its 
subcontractors: is Nike perhaps guilty of some kind of indirect exploitation 
if, for instance, those subcontractors pay unjust wages? 
Eventually Nike ceased to insist it did not produce shoes.  However, the 
measures it took to improve conditions and monitor progress fell short of 
what critics demanded and what competitors were doing.56  In the public
debate, complaints about labor conditions were couched in human rights 
language.57 Wages did figure prominently in this debate, especially because
they paled in comparison to the income celebrities generated through
endorsements.58  But at issue were also safety and health standards that, in
countries like Indonesia and Vietnam, were often lacking, as well as 
overbearing working hours.59  This leads to our final QUESTION 6: do 
such standards generate problems from the standpoint of exploitation? 
52. Id. at 4. 
53. Id. at 4–5. 
54. Id. at 5. 
55. Id. at 6 (citing Jeffrey Ballinger, The New Free-Trade Heel, HARPER’S MAG., 
Aug. 1992, at 46). 
56. See id. at 5.
 57. Id. at 9. 
58. See id.
 59. See id. at 5, 10. 
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The Case ends by reporting on the sweeping reforms Nike eventually 
initiated in response to fierce criticism that had made its products 
synonymous with unduly low wages—often called “slave wages”—forced
overtime, and abuse.60  Nike raised the minimum age of its workers, 
adopted new clean-air standards for factories, expanded its monitoring 
program, and even offered workers microloans.  Nike also got involved 
with reform efforts organized around the Clinton-initiated Apparel Industry 
Partnership. That group eventually cobbled together an agreement among
major players in the sneaker and apparel business complete with an 
oversight organization known as Fair Labor Association.61  But the issue
of wages remained highly contentious, Nike standing accused of still refusing 
to pay acceptable minimum wages.62 
SECTION 4 
Let us begin with QUESTION 1: under what conditions, if any, would 
the decision to outsource production to facilities abroad be morally
problematic?  We need to distinguish between two scenarios: the original 
decision to move to a country other than the one where the company
originated, discussed in this section, and subsequent decisions to move 
from a second to a third country—next section.  We assume a company is
originally founded in a country where those who own and run it are 
citizens and have corresponding duties.  We also assume that, typically, 
relocation is from a developed, fairly wealthy country to a developing, 
fairly poor country.
One might think decisions about outsourcing are business decisions that
are not up for moral evaluation.  However, companies are ultimately
owned by people with prima facie obligations to fellow citizens to help 
create and preserve certain standards of living in their community.  They
also have obligations with regard to the status of equal citizenship.  While 
normally nobody has a duty to found a company, once it exists and people 
60. See id. at 12–13; John H. Cushman, Jr., Nike to Step Forward on Plant Conditions, 
S.D. UNION-TRIB., May 13, 1998, at A1. 
61. Id. at 12.  See Dara O’Rourke, Bringing in Social Actors: Accountability and 
Regulation in the Global Textiles and Apparel Industry, in  MAKING GLOBAL SELF­
REGULATION EFFECTIVE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 113 (Dana Brown and Ngaire Woods 
eds., 2007), on this kind of oversight organizations and related institutional efforts.  See 
JILL ESBENSHADE, MONITORING SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE GLOBAL
APPAREL INDUSTRY (2004), on different ways of monitoring sweatshops. 
62. See Spar, supra note 3, at 13. 
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make choices around its existence, obligations to the community might be 
generated. One might say companies should not accept such obligations 
because individuals should and would not accept them.  But individuals, 
too, may well have obligations towards families and associates that must
be taken into account when they consider relocation. 
So let us distinguish between two cases.  In the first case, the company 
can reasonably expect that it is possible for the community as a whole to 
absorb setbacks arising from its departures, or in any event, that the 
setbacks are reasonably acceptable to the community as a whole.  In the 
second case, the community cannot absorb the setback in a way that is 
reasonably acceptable to them.  The nature of the setback would typically 
be economic decline or negative effects on equal citizenship, especially
by increasing inequality. 
What it would mean for a setback to be acceptable to a community is a 
thorny question.  What is too much to ask is to insist that no individual
should experience such a setback for herself.  A better answer could be 
that the social systems of a country can sensibly be interpreted as being 
committed to a creative-destruction understanding of capitalism: that it 
lies in the nature of capitalist production that businesses that have become 
unviable, or are better pursued elsewhere, cease operations, and that people
move on.63  This could be a response to the concern that a company’s
departure brings economic decline to a local community.  If, indeed, it is
plausible to say the country as a whole is committed to such a creative-
destruction understanding, for instance, in terms of how labor markets are 
organized, then one should say setbacks of this sort always are a real 
possibility and that—in order to make this understanding of capitalism 
acceptable to its citizens—the country as a whole should seek to offer 
alternatives to the employment opportunities initially offered by the now-
relocating company. 
However, not everybody will be in a position (let alone a good position) 
to pursue such alternatives. In many cases, this will require traumatic 
change for people, which should not be downplayed. However, there are 
existential matters at stake on all sides.  Nonetheless, the reference to a
general acceptance of a creative-destruction understanding of capitalism 
would offer one plausible way of saying the community as a whole (the 
63. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 
(Taylor & Francis e-Library ed. 2003) (1943). 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate 
the same process of industrial mutation . . . that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly
creating a new one. 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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country) can absorb the costs from a company’s relocation.  The plausibility 
of the claim that the departure will be acceptable to a community, even if 
there is a shared understanding of capitalism as sketched, will be greatly
strengthened if mechanisms are in place to ease the transition for those 
whose interests suffer. 
Another way in which a setback could be acceptable to a community is 
if social policy is strongly geared towards mitigating negative consequences
for equal citizenship of occurrences in the economy. Suppose the goal of
social policy is to find sensible measures to limit economic inequality— 
inspired by an ideal of equal citizenship—without substantially undermining 
the effectiveness of the economy.  Social policy measures such as assistance 
in relocation or in obtaining additional job training, generous unemployment, 
or social security payments to allow individuals to adjust to the new 
situation without suffering through too much economic decline and loss
of dignity could go a long way towards protecting individuals against the 
vicissitudes of the domestic and global economy.  If such measures are in 
place, one would again have a plausible way of substantiating the claim that
the setbacks arising from a company’s departure would be acceptable to
the community. 
A third way in which a setback could be acceptable to a community is 
if the presence of the business in its midst has always had a windfall
character. That is, the economic activities in question sprung from the 
ingenious creativity of a few and provided benefits to the community that
did not generate noticeable opportunity costs because nothing else would 
have afforded them with opportunities beyond the status quo ante.  In that 
case, the nature of the setback would just be the erasure of a temporary 
improvement that they could not have expected and that did not entice 
them to get invested in a certain line of work.  This strategy would not
work for a community in dire need, such that the survival of many people 
was in jeopardy before the launching of the business in question.  But the 
strategy would succeed within reasonably wealthy communities.  Whether
there are many real world cases in which economic activities spring from 
the ingenious creativity of a few without connection to the support of the 
community is an empirically open question.
So if the company can expect that it is possible for the community to 
absorb setbacks, or in any event to absorb them in such a way that the 
setback becomes reasonably acceptable to the community in one of the 
three ways just sketched, relocation would be morally unproblematic.  A 
trivial fourth case would be that the relocation does not inflict serious 
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damage to begin with because the economic opportunities once provided 
by that company will soon be provided by other enterprises.  In that case 
no serious setback occurs to begin with.  It should be clear from our 
presentation of the four strategies that would help argue that relocation is 
acceptable to a community that we think one or more of them will often
be available if the subject is the possible relocation of a company from a 
wealthy developed country to a poor under-developed one. 
We would like to stress in particular that, to our minds, the right level 
of analysis when it comes to an assessment of the acceptability of a 
relocation is the country as a whole.  It strikes us as morally unacceptable 
in a world that continues to be a world of states that a particular city or 
region would be the right unit of analysis.  Needless to say, it is normally
indeed the case that relocation affects particular cities or regions rather 
than the country as a whole.  But in that case, those who cannot secure
their prospects by relocating to a different part of the same country should 
direct their moral or political outrage not at the company for relocating to 
a developing country, or to the developing country that has managed to 
make the relocation economically sensible for the company, but at their 
government or fellow citizens for refusing to support them through 
adequate social policy measures or incentives to change their line of work. 
Put differently, the target of outrage should be the domestic policies of the 
home country. 
In many cases relocation may be morally highly desirable if it helps 
improve lives in poor countries.  As we noted, as an entity in the global 
order a company also has a duty to do its share to realize human rights.  A 
company would not normally consider relocation unless it sees business 
advantages in that decision. But that does not mean a moral assessment 
of that decision would not also have to consider its contribution to the 
overall realization of human rights in the world.
It is unclear whether there is an actual duty to relocate.  There could be 
other ways of making a contribution to the world’s human rights record. 
But in an economically highly interconnected world, relocation of companies
from wealthy to poor countries could readily be a major engine of progress. 
Nonetheless, if a company relocates to another country it ought to help 
with remedying problems that arise from its departure.  Even if, by relocating, 
the company would indeed do something that is morally desirable, all 
things considered, its obligations to the fellow citizens of those who run 
and own the company would retain enough strength to demand such 
support in the transition period.  And after all, the company itself would 
make its relocation decision because such a move would be profitable.
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Some of the gains from that move would have to be shared with those left
behind.64 
Again, we think it will be a rare case where a wealthy country could not
either absorb a relocation decision or else could adopt suitable social
policies to that end. But what if the country really cannot absorb setbacks 
arising from the departure—at least not in a way that would not generate 
legitimate complaints?  Or what if somebody wanted to resist our arguments 
that the relevant unit of analysis is the country as a whole and that more 
emphasis should be put on identifying social policy measures to mitigate 
negative effects of relocations than is commonly done?  What would drive 
the complaint in such cases is that the people who run and own the company
are fellow citizens and have corresponding obligations to the community. 
Their obligation is to make a fair contribution to the economic and political
well-being of their communities, to the best of their abilities. 
What would presumably also matter is that the infrastructure, culture, 
and human resources of the country in question would have provided
much momentum to the launching and initial success of the company. 
These matters, critics of a relocation decision would admonish, should not
be disregarded. In cases where it will indeed be plausible to say a wealthy
country could not either absorb a relocation decision or else adopt suitable 
social policies to that end, would it also be plausible to say the company
exploits the country it leaves?  We think it would be, in two senses. First, 
by leaving the country vulnerable, as it would be under the circumstances, 
the company would create a situation where the country is open to future 
exploitation by third parties.  In addition, it would be appropriate to describe
the whole recent period of interaction between country and company as 
exploitative, in a retrospective sense.  That is, what is exploitative is the 
combination of “having produced in country X in a way that made that
country heavily dependent” and “now leaving the country.” 
In light of obligations for which one could argue, based on the points 
just mentioned, as a rule companies should not relocate if the gap caused
at home is out of proportion to the good relocation would do abroad.  The 
relevant comparisons will often be hard to make.  If we are talking about
relocation to developing countries, in many cases companies would thereby 
64. One might ask if, following our reasoning, a company ought not to relocate 
anyway, even if such a move would not be profitable.  After all, such a move might still
benefit people in the poorer country.  But it might be too much to ask of a company to take 
measures that would undermine its viability as a competitive entity that needs to prevail 
on the market to survive. 
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shoulder their share of human rights obligations.  Those obligations would
be limited in reach and not concerned with many features of shared
citizenship. But they would be urgent.  As opposed to that, as far as their 
fellow citizens are concerned, they have different obligations, and those 
include maintenance of equal citizenship. 
In light of the urgency of the human rights concerns in the developing 
world, we again arrive at a point where there is strong reason to put 
pressure on the formulation that the community in question “cannot” 
absorb the consequences of a relocation or would have legitimate complaints 
about it. In many cases, again, this will be so only to the extent that other
policies, including social policies such as unemployment insurance or
support in obtaining more education, are seen as fixed.  In this spirit, in 
particular outsourcing from the U.S. to developing countries, as Nike 
decided to in our Case, would normally be unproblematic—and not 
exploitative according to our account of exploitation—and often be 
morally highly desirable, all things considered.65 
65. The line of reasoning presented here is starkly at odds with national policies. 
Keeping jobs at home is a major priority even for governments that are in principle friendly
towards the acceptance of obligations to developing countries. Consider the following
excerpt from an article in the Economist concerned with personnel changes at the helm of
Volkswagen:
But shifting work from VW’s German factories to foreign ones . . . would be 
almost impossible for Mr[.] Winterkorn, and whoever succeeds him as CEO, to
push through. The state of Lower Saxony has a 20% share of the votes on the 
supervisory board, and thus a veto on strategic decisions under a law passed
when the firm was privatized in 1960.  Unions also have representation on the 
board . . . . Both are likely to resist any big job cuts in Germany.
Volkswagen: Driven Out, THE ECONOMIST (May 2, 2015), http://www.economist. 
com/news/business/21650152-carmakers-domineering-chairman-leaves-his-successor­
would-have-trouble-changing [https://perma.cc/26S2-VZM6].  What is reported here is a
rather typical attitude towards relocation among union leaders and democratic representatives.
Relocating production to a different country, specifically from Germany, would be
especially hard after the passing of social policy reforms known as Agenda 2010.  Widely
credited with making Germany more competitive by cutting benefits of employees and
unemployed, Agenda 2010 has withdrawn much state support from the unemployed and
thus diminished precisely those options we argue should be there. See Germany’s Labour 
Market: Wunderreform, THE  ECONOMIST (May 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/europe/21573583-ten-years-how-does-germanys-agenda-2010-package-rate-wunder
reform [https://perma.cc/9HU9-2NM7]. The challenge is to design a social policy framework 
that can provide the required assistance while also keeping the economy competitive.  But
the economy should not be kept competitive at the expense of people in developing 
countries. 
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SECTION 5 
Nike’s original relocation decision was to move operations to places in 
Asia.66  There is reason to think this decision was unobjectionable. But
subsequently the company moved operations within Asia.67  In this case,
the relevant considerations are different than in the original decision.  On
the one hand, the company now has no obligations from shared citizenship, 
which should generally make it easier to relocate from a second to a third 
country.  On the other hand, several considerations we encountered above 
that could be used as reasons for why a company’s departure should be 
acceptable to a country will not be applicable to developing countries, in 
particular that the country generally accepts a creative-destruction approach 
to capitalism or that the country has social policies in place to mitigate 
negative consequences: developing countries will normally be too poor 
for either to be the case. The absence of these considerations should make 
it more difficult to justify leaving, other things being equal.  Policy spaces 
in developing countries are much more limited than those of developed
countries. 
In this new situation, the company has human rights-related obligations, 
rather than any obligations emerging from shared citizenship.  But crucially, 
these obligations accrue to the company qua entity in the global order, and 
in a broad range of circumstances people in the second country, to which
the company relocated, have as strong a claim to being the beneficiaries 
of those obligations, and certainly no stronger claim, than people in a third 
country to which the company might relocate next do.  Under what 
circumstances, then, would relocation be problematic or unproblematic?
Let us assume that the presence of the company makes a difference to 
the economic prospects of the community, that is, that the local population 
has made noticeable or even substantial investments connected to the 
company’s presence and cannot readily resume other work. Relocation 
from one developing country to another will be morally unproblematic if 
this happens, because the economy in the former improves, perhaps partly
because of the presence of companies like Nike.  Labor might become less 
commonly available.  Workers might become more productive across the 
board but also have alternative employment options, so that the ratio
between what they need to be paid and what they add makes it sensible 
66. Spar, supra note 3, at 3.
 67. Id. 
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for the company to relocate.  This is what happened when Nike moved
from Japan to Korea and Taiwan and later to China and Indonesia.68  In
such cases the departure is symptomatic of an economic success to which 
the company may well have contributed but that eventually renders its 
presence economically unviable.69  If employees have received a fair bargain 
from its presence, the company does not owe them additional consideration 
other than some support to help with the transition.
However, relocation would be problematic if employees made themselves 
vulnerable because the company’s actions led them to acquire skills they 
can no longer use upon the company’s departure and, in addition, they
have missed out on other opportunities for betterment.  In this case relocation 
would be exploitative—in the retrospective sense we introduced earlier— 
regardless of whether the overall economy has improved and of whether 
the company had communicated to the government of the relevant country
or the local inhabitants of its production sites that it might well move on 
soon, regardless of what opportunity costs its employees would incur. 
People in developing countries are too vulnerable for such upfront clarity
to make a difference.
Relocation would also be morally problematic if the company has been 
present in the second country long enough that there is no other way of
making a living to which its employees could meaningfully “return.”  In 
this case the loss of their traditional way of doing things by itself would 
constitute a substantial opportunity cost, no matter how desolate it was,
and no matter whether there would have been other possibilities for 
improvement that were forfeited because of the presence of the company. 
The company would be accountable for having become a vital part of its 
employees’ lives, to which, at this stage, they have no status quo ante 
alternative. 
Again, the kind of human rights obligations the company has are held 
vis-à-vis people in the second country as much as to people in the third 
country.  Still, if people made themselves vulnerable in response to the 
company’s presence in their country, the company also has obligations to 
them that put people in the second country in a special status vis-à-vis the 
company.  How much such obligations weigh depends on the extent to 
which people in the second country had made themselves vulnerable, on
the one hand, and on the extent of anticipated improvement in the third 
country, on the other.  Little more can be said at this abstract level.  In any 
event, as we already noted, Nike’s behavior as discussed in the Case 
seems less problematic than many activists may have assumed, although 
68. See id. 
69. There is an empirical question here as to how to characterize the contribution 
of such companies to economic growth in developing countries. 
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its motivation may have to be assessed separately, as far as its relocation 
decisions are concerned. 
SECTION 6 
Let us turn to QUESTION 2.  How should one think about Nike’s and 
its subcontractors’ dealings with an authoritarian regime and the resulting 
repressed labor pool?  Recall the relevant part from the Case: the labor
pool is politically repressed, and there are either no unions at all or unions
with weak bargaining abilities due to the corruption that undermines 
possibilities for enforcement of labor protection.70  Even though their 
productivity rises, political repression prevents workers from receiving 
adequate wages.
These workers are exploited.  This is a situation where, as in the earlier 
discussion about companies A and B, a company such as Nike can be seen
taking up some of the human rights obligations we all share.71  But they 
also exploit their workers.  To begin with, they exploit them in Steiner’s 
sense.72  Suppose worker-protection laws are morally required, as they 
plausibly are—in this case, worker protection laws were also, in fact, in
place. Then Nike took unfair advantage of a situation where workers 
suffer from prior rights violations due to the climate of impunity under 
which wages and working conditions are determined.  Nike also exploits 
its workers in Vrousalis’s sense: it instrumentalizes economic vulnerability 
to trigger an unreciprocated net transfer of goods in a way that is offensive 
to the equal status of the exploited.73 
The difficult question is not whether these are instances of exploitation 
(they are), but what companies such as Nike ought to do about this.  As 
we noticed at the end of section 2, the path from an unjust to a just world
may well have to lead through other unjust stages. The crucial question is 
whether engaging in exploitation is plausibly the right path to a just world, 
or, as we will say, a stepping-stone towards a just world.  Before engaging 
that question in the Nike scenario, it will be worth our while to consider 
the general issue in a bit more detail. 
So what kinds of injustice could the consideration that the path from
our current unjust to a just world will have to go through additional layers
 70. Spar, supra note 3, at 3.
 71. See supra Section 2. 
72. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
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of injustice justify? This is a question about non-ideal theory. One might 
wonder, to mention an extreme case, whether genocidal episodes in world 
history can be justified because they led to the creation of the Genocide 
Convention.  Clearly this inference must be precluded. An apt way of
doing so is by insisting that going from a state of injustice SI1 to a state of 
justice SJ, it is both necessary and permissible to go through a state of
injustice SI2. Let us call the former the necessity criterion for SI2’s being
a stepping stone towards SJ. For this criterion to be part of a non-ideal 
theory that could bear on global political circumstances, the kind of 
necessity involved here could not be logical, physical, or even biological, 
but would have to be political necessity. Act A is politically/economically
necessary to reach goal G if without A there will not be enough support 
among those who have the power to bring about G actually to do so. 
Needless to say, it will often be highly contentious among both activists 
and theorists whether any given act is politically/economically necessary
in this way. 
However, the necessity criterion would at least need to be supplemented
with a permissibility criterion. SI2 can plausibly be a stepping stone 
towards a just world SJ only if SI2 does not add an amount of injustice to 
the existing state of the world SI1 that would lead us to conclude that a just 
world is not worth the costs incurred by its pursuit.  If a just world can be 
reached only through injustices of a monstrous scale, then such a world 
may well be beyond reach, and we have to make do with an unjust one. 
So the necessity criterion by itself is insufficient to accept SI2 as a stepping 
stone towards SJ. 
Relying on both the necessity and the permissibility criteria, we could 
reliably rule out the genocide scenario and distinguish it from cases 
involving exploitation.  Invoking the necessity criterion, one could argue 
that, quite possibly, we do not need to commit certain crimes to put laws 
on the books to outlaw them.  It is enough to know it is within human
reach to do certain things. But skeptics may object that it could still be
true that there would not be enough support to put such laws on the books 
unless the problem in question has already arisen.  In fact, in light of the 
inertia and status quo bias that characterizes many political processes, this 
is a rather common scenario.  This is where the permissibility criterion 
comes into play: given the severity of the injustice of a genocide, an 
appeal to necessity is clearly not a sufficient reason to accept this kind of 
crime as a stepping-stone towards justice.  Things are different in the case 
of exploitation: what might be necessary, given the current state of the
world economy, is that we go through stages where people are exploited, 
because otherwise one could not create the kind of political and economic
circumstances under which the sort of increase in productivity that would 
facilitate the transition to a more just society could become possible.  In 
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this case, the permissibility consideration that would rule out the gratuitous 
genocide does not seem to apply.
But while the necessity criterion in isolation is insufficient for the 
purpose at hand, we should notice that it is also too strong.  Perhaps there 
are other states of the world SI3 and SI4 that would also eventually lead to 
SJ. In that case, specifically passing through SI2 would not be necessary
to reach SJ. So if SI2 could be a stepping stone towards a just world only 
if there is no other way of reaching SJ, then the existence of SI3 and SI4 
would undermine the claim that it is such a stepping stone.  Things are 
made complicated by the fact that questions about how to bring about a 
just world do not arise for a global social planner who has the power of
changing parameters around the world all at once.  Instead, they arise for 
decision makers who, no matter how powerful they are, merely control 
some components of the global state of affairs.  They would have to assess 
the justifiably of aiming for SI2 in pursuit of SJ with limited knowledge of 
what other actors will do. 
In light of these various considerations, a sensible criterion would be 
this: SI2 will be acceptable as a stepping stone from SI1 towards SJ as far
as actor A is concerned if and only if SI2 does not generate injustices that
render the pursuit of SJ via SI2 morally unacceptable and it does not lie in 
A’s power—to the best of what they should know and within the limits of 
what can reasonably be expected of A—to pursue SJ in ways that lead 
through SI3, which generates less injustice in the domains of human 
activity for which A can be held accountable, all things considered. This 
account considers that A will normally not have obligations of justice for 
all domains of human activity that come up for evaluation in terms of 
justice; that A has limited knowledge about the world, but that there are 
standards of what knowledge A should have that A can be held accountable
to; that A has limited capacities to change things; and that there are limits 
to how much effort A could be expected to contribute towards the pursuit 
of justice. 
While any injustice as such remains unjustifiable, SI2 can then be 
justified as a stepping stone towards SJ given that our starting point is SI1. 
This is very much a non-ideal kind of account.  Ideally everybody should 
stop making their contributions to an unjust world.  But that ideally this 
should happen offers little aid to a conscientious agent who reflects on
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what she could do in her situation to help with the transition from where 
we are now to a just world.74 
SECTION 7 
With this abstract viewpoint in place, a story about Nike in Indonesia 
might be told as follows. While there is little economic opportunity and 
the average skill set of workers is very restricted, workers are highly
vulnerable. They have few options on the labor market, and their political
power is limited because they so badly need particular jobs that they will 
normally not be able to take risks to fight for improvements.  But over 
time, as more opportunities become available and workers acquire more
extensive skill sets, they have more options and become more empowered.
However, to set such a process in motion companies must do business in
the country to begin with.  For any one company, it will not normally be 
possible to improve conditions by itself—absent the kind of dominance 
the United Fruit Company exercised over certain Central American countries, 
a case we discuss below.75  Given low productivity, any one company 
would have to assume that if it tried to improve conditions on its own, its 
business at that location would likely flounder and thus would leave the 
overall situation unaltered.76 
A company like Nike would face a dirty-hands problem. Dirty-hands
problems arise if one is in a situation where a bad action seems to be 
required to bring about a good result.  Companies dealing with repressive 
states often face a relatively mild version of such a problem because they 
make arrangements with corrupt, uncaring, and often patrimonial regimes 
that nonetheless likely benefit the victims of exploitation in the long run. 
In more severe dirty-hands problems, either arrangements would have to 
be made, say, with people who are responsible for mass atrocities, or else 
the interests, possibly the lives, of some are discarded for the greater good, 
or in any event for the benefit of others. 
More specifically, what are the conditions under which it is acceptable 
to play along with a repressive regime and its corrupt bureaucracy?  One 
74. These last few paragraphs touch on many issues that deserve more detailed 
reflection than we can offer here.  But we do need to introduce at least the broad contours 
of such an account for the purposes of this paper.  JAMES, supra note 24, 308–14, also 
explores when exploitation would be acceptable as a stepping stone.  He insists, however, 
that the exploited workers themselves eventually have to benefit.  See id. at 311.  Our 
criterion above does not include such a condition. It would be highly desirable if this were 
so, but there might be circumstances where it is not.
 75. See infra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
76. Alternatively, companies could adopt a “fair trade” strategy and advertise 
themselves by the conditions under which they produce. 
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could sensibly think of the following conditions: the company offers 
conditions that are generally on the upper end of what worker productivity 
permits and what local customs prescribe.  There is good reason to think 
this kind of economic presence contributes to improvements within a 
predictable timeframe rather than locking the economy into a dead end, or 
if it does lock the economy into a dead end, one would have to be extremely 
confident that nothing else on the horizon could lead to improvements. 
The company actively fights any form of discretionary exploitation— 
including a fight against any kind of attack on personal integrity rights; 
the company is duly diligent in apprising itself of the overall human rights 
situation in that region; the company is supportive of efforts to improve 
deficiencies in that situation and does not get implicated in making things
worse; and the company plays an appropriate part in generating industry-
wide efforts to generate improvements in a coordinated manner, such as 
the Apparel Industry Partnership in this particular case or the more recent
U.N. “Human Rights and Business” initiative.77 
Under such conditions a business does as much as it can to help make 
things better without ceasing to be profit-oriented, and we can sensibly
think of its presence as a stepping stone towards justice.  The reasoning 
that the path from an unjust to a just world may well have to pass through 
many stages of injustice provides support for the company’s economic 
engagement in the country.  The point is not that economic advancement
must take precedent over promoting civil and political rights.  We follow 
authors such as Henry Shue and Amartya Sen in insisting that the different 
kinds of human rights must be advanced together.78  The question is how
a company should be engaged in a deficient human rights situation.79
 77. See Spar, supra note 3, at 7, on the Apparel Industry Partnership. On the U.N.
“Human Rights and Business” initiative, see JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at xx-xxi (2013). 
78. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 5, 7–8 (1980); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 230–31, 242–44 (1999).
 79. Chris Meyers, Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops, 
35 J. SOC. PHIL. 319, 329–30 (2004), argues that a company like Nike should accept the 
minimum profit necessary for the business to survive in the long run and forego excess 
profits. Mayer responds that the manufacturing and retail sectors of apparel business are 
so intensely competitive that the minimum profit necessary to survive is the maximum 
profit that can be made. Mayer, Sweatshops, Exploitation, and Moral Responsibility, supra 
note 36, at 617.  Zwolinski argues that the choice sweatshop workers made when they
decided to accept that kind of labor over other options must be respected.  Matt Zwolinski, 
Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 689 (2007).  See Jeremy Snyder, 
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The conditions we just sketched outline a morally fairly clean situation.
Even though the exploitation is an injustice, the company should get 
involved so that it can play its part in overcoming the moral shortfall. But 
often it will be unclear whether these conditions hold. The government 
may not be callous, incompetent, and patrimonial but aggressively
oppressive. Political structures might work in favour of a small elite to 
the exclusion of large parts of the population, as described by Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson.80  Companies would then merely be
co-opted into maintaining a despicable status quo, profiting from an
exploitative situation that harbours slim prospects for substantive 
improvements for the workers.  Or in any event, there will be much ambiguity
in ascertaining whether it does.  The fact that, after all, the company makes
profits in that environment will not make its representatives good 
judges for assessing whether it is helping the course of justice or merely
supporting an entrenched elite. 
Consider for instance the collapse, on April 24, 2013, of Rana Plaza, an
eight-story commercial building in the Dhaka area in Bangladesh.81  The
official death toll amounted to 1,129 people.  This is considered the 
deadliest garment-factory accident ever.82  In spite of warnings issued 
after large cracks had appeared, workers were ordered to return to work.83 
The building was structurally deficient—having been built on a pond, with
substandard construction materials—and was subsequently converted from
commercial to industrial use.84 
Responsibility was also placed on the business climate in Bangladesh.
The tightly organized garment lobby holds much power, and intense profit 
Exploitation and Demeaning Choices, 12 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 345, 356 (2013), for the 
competing view that such a choice is demeaning.
 80. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS
OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012). 
81. “Whoever Raises Their Head Suffers the Most”: Worker’s Rights in
Bangladesh’s Garment Factories, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.hrw. 
org/report/2015/04/22/whoever-raises-their-head-suffers-most/workers-rights-bangladeshs­
arment [https://perma.cc/RR2S-AFBU].
 82. Jason Motlagh, In Wake of Rana Plaza Tragedy, Bangladesh Garment-Factory 
Inspections Floundering, TIME (Sept. 12, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/09/12/in­
wake-of-rana-plaza-tragedy-bangladesh-garment-factory-inspections-floundering/ [https://
perma.cc/YJ3K-C9H9].
 83. Dean Nelson, Bangladesh Building Collapse Kills at Least 82 in Dhaka, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/bangladesh/ 
10014778/Bangladesh-building-collapse-kills-at-least-82-in-Dhaka.html [https://perma.cc/
B4KH-LYFW].
84. John A. Quelch & Margaret L. Rodriguez, Rana Plaza: Workplace Safety in
Bangladesh (A), Harvard Business School Case Study No. 514-062 (Rev. Feb. 20, 2015), 
at 3, https://hbr.org/product/Rana-Plaza—Workplace-Saf/an/514034-PDF-ENG [https:// 
perma.cc/B46G-6SG8]. 
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orientation and—both national and international—competition created
conditions under which safety and well-being of the workers were neglected. 
Workers did not have the opportunity to be collectively organized and
compel owners to take their interests seriously.85  The political clout of the
garment lobby, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association, B.G.M.E.A, prevented them from effectively pursuing their 
interests. It was perceived that union activity would increase workforce 
costs and thus jeopardize the garment industry.86  Responsibility was also 
placed on irresponsible purchasing practices of Western buyers, who put 
factories under tight deadlines.87 
Garment exports have been an engine of progress in Bangladesh in 
recent decades, accounting for 80% of manufacturing exports in 2013.88 
Factory owners see themselves as providing an enormous public service, 
by providing jobs and income, but also by doing much of the regulatory
work for the industry that the corrupt and weak state fails to attend to.89 
One way of thinking about the situation is that it is good news for 
Bangladesh that demand for the products of its many nimble workers is 
high. Bangladesh is trailing only China in garment exports.90  The Rana
Plaza collapse is a tragic consequence of what nonetheless is a boom.  But
the B.G.M.E.A is unusually powerful, not only by de facto being its own 
regulatory authority and by controlling which companies get to export
products “made in Bangladesh,” but also by having strong parliamentary
representation.91 About 10% of legislators own garment factories.92 
Often the role of business in scenarios such as this is ambivalent.  But 
this just puts more pressure on the conditions listed above.  Surely the
garment industry is an essential ingredient of economic betterment in
Bangladesh. For that reason, companies should get involved with that 
sector, but their role as agents of change must be emphasized.  To the 
85. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 81. 
86. See Jim Yardley, Garment Trade Wields Power in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/world/asia/garment-trade-wields­
power-in-bangladesh.html [https://perma.cc/Z2RX-DL4S]. 
87. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 81. 
88. Improving Working Conditions in the Ready Made Garment Industry: Progress 
and Achievements, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Nov. 2015), http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/What 
wedo/Projects/WCMS_240343/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Q4AF-6YMU]. 
89. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 81. 
90. Id.
 91. See Yardley, supra note 86. 
92. Id. 
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extent that the overall political and business climate is shaped by corruption, 
it will be difficult to be credible as agents of change.  In such a case, one
important role of business is to campaign for more involvement of
international oversight entities.  While the typical realistic scenarios in 
which businesses must operate do not invalidate the moral advice offered 
above, they do require rethinking which bits of that advice are the most 
important under the circumstances.  Nonetheless, as long as there is some 
plausible story to be told about how business can work for the better, the 
main question is how to be an agent of change under the circumstances. 
Businesses should remain engaged. 
SECTION 8 
The underlying assumption has been, so far, that the company is a 
relatively minor player in the country.  Perhaps it has some influence on 
the government, but not the kind of influence that would shape the political 
and economic climate.  But what if a company does have that kind of 
influence? A well-known recent example, ignoring entities such as the 
Dutch or British East India Company, was the Boston-based United Fruit 
Company (UFCO), which wielded enormous power in countries like Costa 
Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala, and whose activities in those countries 
gave rise to the term “Banana republic” long before that word was hijacked 
by Gap.93  For instance, in Guatemala after World War II, UFCO was the
largest landowner and the largest employer—via its subsidiary railway
company, it was also the second largest landowner.94  It also owned almost
all Guatemala’s railway tracks.  The company acquired most of its lands 
and its pre-eminence under dictatorships, without having to deal with any 
kind of labour organizations or codes. Most U.S. policy-makers involved 
with Guatemala had ties to UFCO.95 
UFCO had, at best, a mixed record on promoting the development of
countries where it operated.  It built extensive railroads and ports, providing 
employment and transportation.96  It created schools for the people who 
lived and worked on company land.97  But it also allowed vast tracts of
land to remain uncultivated to discourage competitors and reserve 
93. PETER CHAPMAN, BANANAS: HOW THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY SHAPED THE 
WORLD 1, 5–6 (2007). 
94. LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY
TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 337 (1998). 
95. Id.; see also CHAPMAN, supra note 93, at 126 (providing greater detail). But see 
DIANE K. STANLEY, FOR THE RECORD: THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY’S SIXTY-SIX YEARS IN
GUATEMALA 21 (1994) (providing a benevolent take on UFCO’s record in Guatemala). 
96. See STANLEY, supra note 95. 
97. Id. at 120. 
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possibilities for future expansion.98  In Guatemala it discouraged the 
government from building highways, which would lessen the profitability 
of its railway company’s transportation monopoly.99 
UFCO exploited workers by keeping them in a state of vulnerability.
But it also exploited the country as a whole by stymying any process of
self-determined development. It was the country as a whole that was 
dominated, rather than merely a group of people living there.  Could such
exploitation be a stepping stone to a more just world?  Perhaps one could 
think of circumstances where it could be, if realistic alternatives at a 
certain stage would have been an oppressive dictatorship that would
generate almost no benefits for the people. But if this much was ever true,
this constellation of factors—one company dominating the economy of a 
small country with one product, with the assistance of powerful politicians 
in a bigger country—could work towards a more just world only for a very 
limited period of time.  After that, the moral obligation of the company— 
and this, by the way, was very much what John Stuart Mill thought the 
British East India Company should do in due course100—would be to aid 
the development of the country by liquidating itself, in a way that preserves 
many of the good things it has created while generating as few new problems 
as possible. 
SECTION 9 
Let us turn to QUESTION 3.  QUESTION 2 concerned the general issue 
of how to deal with an autocratic regime that creates an oppressed labor 
pool. One other question that arises here is about noncompliance with
existing legislation and regulation.  The interesting case is noncompliance
with regulation that is morally well-founded, worker-protection legislation of
a sort that was on the books in Indonesia.  Is it permissible to disregard 
such legislation in a general business climate that does so? 
Companies should not contribute to the creation of a climate where 
existing morally well-founded labor legislation is disregarded with 
impunity—to the extent that it would, the offense would be tantamount to
thievery and corruption.  Suppose the business is not responsible for a 
98. See CHAPMAN, supra note 93, at 8. 
99. See  PAUL J. DOSAL, DOING BUSINESS WITH THE DICTATORS: A  POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF UNITED FRUIT IN GUATEMALA 1899–1944, at 218 (SR Books ed. 2005) (1993). 
100. Mark Tunick, Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill’s Defense of British Rule 
in India, 68 REV. POL. 586, 586–89 (2006). 
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climate where existing legislation cannot be utilized.  There is a climate 
of corruption in the courts that makes it impossible for workers to get 
rights enforced, including minimum wages, and noncompliance with existing 
regulation is widespread among competitors. So the issue is that a company 
could get away with violating morally well-grounded laws that are already
on the books. Should they do so?  This raises somewhat different issues 
from the matter about repressed labor.  In that case we focused on the 
generally bad situation in the country, not on the fact that there is a beacon
of light that is not generally followed.  But that was one of the features of
the situation in Indonesia—they did have labor protection laws on the books,
but indeed, one could break them with impunity.  Should one? So this is 
now not about cooperating with a bad regime, but about going against 
laws that are already on the book, where the country seems to make progress. 
There are two competing considerations at play in such scenarios.101  On 
the one hand, Nike could invoke considerations of comparative fairness 
to justify its own noncompliance in light of widespread noncompliance 
among competitors: incurring the cost of complying with existing regulation,
for instance by paying higher wages and securing health and safety
standards, Nike would be unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis noncomplying 
competitors.  On the other hand, there is the moral force of the existing 
legislation: not only is there a reason to comply with existing rules but the 
considerations rendering the rules legitimate, to wit, important interests of 
the workers, give Nike a reason to comply with legislation even if others 
do not.
Which of these two competing considerations is more important?  It 
seems that, absent special circumstances, the reasons grounding the original 
duty to comply are weightier than considerations of fairness among
competitors. Nike suffering an unfair cost-disadvantage relative to Reebok 
is less of a moral problem than failing to protect the interests of poor and 
vulnerable workers. Therefore avoiding the former cannot justify doing 
the latter. 
There might be one exception: if as a consequence of the unfairness, the
complying company is driven out of business, and consequently can no 
longer engage as an agent of change, continuing to act as an agent of change 
would be more important than respecting a particular piece of legislation. 
The rationale is similar to the one discussed in the context of QUESTION 
2. If failing to play by the rules is necessary for achieving overall justice 
101. These cases can be seen as slightly modified versions of what David Miller 
discusses under the label of “taking up the slack” in Taking Up the Slack? Responsibility 
and Justice in Situations of Partial Compliance, in  RESPONSIBILITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 230, 232–34 (Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska eds., 2011). The argument of
this section focuses on two of the considerations that Miller mentions. 
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improvements within a reasonably short time-horizon, noncompliance 
could be another stepping stone on the way to justice.  We believe that cases 
in which this rationale applies will be rare.  It is doubtful that a company 
that is in violation of morally justified regulation and legislation is a 
promising agent of change for the better. And if the conditions to do business 
involve violations of the most fundamental norms, no business should be 
done.
SECTION 10
It is time to conclude this first of two explorations of the Nike Case to 
get some traction for our account of exploitation to pass judgment in
concrete cases. The first topic we have explored is what moral questions 
arise in the context of relocating or outsourcing a business.  We distinguished 
two cases: the original relocation from a wealthy developed country to a
poor developing country and additional relocations from one developing 
country to another.  We found that there are conditions under which both 
kinds of relocation would be problematic—and exploitative, as the scenario 
may be—but we also found that both kinds are morally unproblematic 
under rather common conditions and that, in fact, such a course of action
will often be morally praiseworthy.  It bears emphasizing that protests in 
developed countries against job loss arising from relocation are often 
misdirected at companies.  A better target would be social policy makers 
and fellow citizens in the home country who refuse to take appropriate 
measures to help out those who are negatively affected by relocations. 
The second question we explored is how a company should deal with 
an authoritarian regime in a country where it does business.  The crucial
move in our response was to introduce a notion of one state of injustice 
being a stepping stone from the present unjust state of the world to a just
world. One way in which the current state of the world is unjust is by
being full of exploitation.  Such exploitation is unjust, and as such
unjustifiable.  What may well be justifiable, however, is the presence of
exploitation in transitory states given our starting point, and an unjust 
world and given our target, a just world.  We have spelled out in detail 
what this would mean for the actions of a company like Nike.  Our final 
question was under what conditions violations of existing labor-legislation
are acceptable.  It turned out that, absent special circumstances, companies 
ought to comply even if their competitors do not.
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